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Financial liquidity, geopolitics, and oil prices




This paper aims simultaneously to study the global dynamic relationship of oil prices,
financial liquidity, and geopolitical risk, on the one hand, and the economic performance
of oil-exports-dependent economies on the other. Global and country-specific dynamics
are studied together in a Global Vector Autoregression (GVAR) model that allows differ-
ent lag structures for different variables in different countries. Global impulse response
functions from the estimated model suggest that new waves of high oil prices are un-
likely, despite the likely continuation of high global financial liquidity and heightened
geopolitical risk, which had driven earlier episodes of very high oil prices. With oil
remaining at modest to low prices by recent historical standards, we study the prospects
for economic growth in oil-export-dependent economies through dramatic increases
in domestic investment, as planned under Visions 2030 of some Arab countries, and
conclude that, unfortunately, success is unlikely.
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1. Introduction
A number of Arab economies are undergoing or about to undergo a painful transition pe-
riod necessitated by fundamental transformations in oil markets, large revenue windfalls
from which had shaped these economies over several decades. The effect of petrodollars
has been pronounced, not only in shaping their primary recipients, which are the major
oil-exporting countries with relatively small populations, but also their labor-exporting
neighbors. Economies of the latter have largely been shaped by workers’ remittances
from oil-exporting countries, as well as the investment patterns (mostly in real estate)
favored in these latter countries, which are the primary origin countries of their foreign
investment.
In recent years, countries in the Middle East have finally come to accept the dawning
of a post-petrodollar world, as the OPEC cartel lost significant market-supply power
due to shale production from the United States, and forecast oil demand continues to
decline with technological advances and environmental regulations, especially in the
transportation and power generation sectors. Thus, a number of Arab countries have
begun to construct medium to long-term economic plans that emphasize diversification
to wean their economies away from direct and indirect dependence on crude-oil sales
revenues. Most notable among these are the highly publicized Vision 2030 of Saudi
Arabia (the largest Arab economy) and its earlier namesake sibling in Egypt (the largest
Arab country by population).1
Both visions rely on the forecast success of massive infrastructure and other invest-
ment programs to transform regional economies, provide job opportunities for their
alarmingly-fast-growing labor forces, and enhance their prospects in an increasingly
competitive global economy. The massive capital needs of those investment programs
are envisioned to be met through privatization (including a possible, albeit repeatedly
delayed, initial public offering for Saudi Aramco, which may be the largest in history);
through foreign direct investment, which has not been forthcoming; or, increasingly,
through debt issuances. The latter have helped to finance fiscal deficits, in part to fuel
public infrastructure investments in the hope of spurring future private investment.
1The Egyptian Vision was unveiled during the ramp-up to a major investor conference in March 2015. The
Saudi Vision was unveiled in a highly publicized announcement in April 2016, but heavily based on an earlier
document published by McKinsey Global Institute in December 2015.
Abdel-Latif and El-Gamal — Oil, Liquidity, and Geopolitics — July 29, 2019 3
Success or failure in the design and implementation of these optimistically transformative
economic visions is of critical importance, not only for the Middle East and North Africa
region, but also for the entire world, because, as some have put it, only partly in jest:
“What happens in the Middle East does not stay in the Middle East.” The econometric
methodology that we use in this paper takes this notion seriously. Global and domestic
variables interact in significant and often complicated ways that we need to understand
empirically. In turn, because, as Shakespeare put it, “what’s past is prologue,” it is
necessary to use the best available empirical methods to extract maximal information
from available historical data. This allows us to examine various scenarios that shed
light on the potential success or failure of the region’s economic attempts to adjust to a
post-petrodollar world. In this regard, our estimated long-term domestic, regional, and
global economic relationships serve as context and de facto constraints.
We investigate the interactions of three main variables at both global and domestic levels,
using a large quarterly dataset that we compiled to cover fifty-three countries over the
period from the first quarter of 1979 to the second quarter of 2017. The main global
variables in our model are oil prices, global financial liquidity, and geopolitical risk,
which we complement with domestic data on gross domestic product (GDP), investment
(measured as gross capital formation), international reserves, and geopolitical risk at
the country level. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to consider all
three global variables simultaneously, and we do so using a Global Vector Autoregres-
sion (GVAR) framework that allows us to investigate the aggregate effects of collective
economic fluctuations at the domestic level, and vice versa. In this regard, Mohaddes
and Pesaran (2016) and some earlier papers cited therein have shown the usefulness of
the GVAR framework in identifying possibly very different impacts of country-specific
fluctuations on global variables, and vice versa.
The reason for considering simultaneously oil prices, financial liquidity, and geopolitical
risk should be clear to those who have studied any of these three variables in global and
Middle East economics contexts. For example, the advent of the petrodollar age in the
period 1973–79 would not have been possible were it not for the simultaneous occurrence
of (i) transformation in the international financial system to a high-liquidity Dollar-based
post-Bretton-Woods regime, and (ii) the geopolitical catalysts of the Vietnam War (the
cost of which forced the United States to unpeg the Dollar from gold in 1971), the Arab-
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Israeli War of October 1973, and the Iranian Revolution of 1979. In turn, the recycling of
petrodollars from oil exporting countries with limited absorptive economic capacities
contributed to global financial liquidity and the ensuing sovereign debt crises of the
1980s. A similar pattern occurred during the later wave of petrodollars starting in 2003,
and contributed to the financial crisis in 2007–8, as discussed extensively in El-Gamal and
Jaffe (2009). The latter considered the roles of petrodollars and Middle East geopolitics in
endogenizing financial cycles, as Barsky and Kilian (2004) had endogenized energy price
fluctuations, and following the logic of financial boom and bust cycles explained in the
seminal works of Kindleberger and Aliber (2005) and Minsky (1982).
It should be clear that recent geopolitical events within our sample period, from 1979
to 2017, cannot be separated from global financial conditions and oil prices. The first
Iraq War, and the ensuing meteoric rise of Islamist terrorist groups, would not have been
as likely were it not for low oil prices starting in the mid-1980s. In his letter to the late
King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and later in a message to his supporters, Ossama bin Laden
highlighted this connection by calling the precipitous decline of oil prices from near
$100 per barrel to $9 “the greatest theft in history” (Lawrence, 2005, p. 272). Conversely,
the phenomenal increase in oil prices starting in 2003 would not have been as likely
were it not for the second Iraq War that year, as well as a global financial liquidity surge
facilitated in part by petrodollars. Acknowledging the latter connection, albeit in the
opposite direction, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) concluded in its February
2015 review of global liquidity that “recent changes in production and consumption are
not enough by themselves to explain the extent and timing of the drop in oil prices. One
should consider the nature of crude oil as a financial asset.”2
Finally, the advent of Arab Spring uprisings, especially starting in Tunisia and Egypt,
which had been considered exemplary economic success stories between 2005 and 2010,
may not have materialized were it not for economic frustrations in the aftermath of
the 2007–8 financial crisis that resulted from excessive global financial liquidity (the
catastrophically embarrassing misstatement by the International Monetary Fund in the
2010 Egypt Article IV consultation that the country was resilient to the financial crisis
notwithstanding.3 In turn, the heightened geopolitical risk in the aftermath of those Arab
2http://www.bis.org/statistics/gli/gli_feb15.pdf, page 1.
3http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2010/021610.htm.
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uprisings contributed, together with the financial liquidity considerations raised by BIS
in 2015, to keeping oil prices high despite a glut in the physical market. This is illustrated
in Figure 1, which shows year-on-year annual percentage change in two of our three
global variables of interest (global liquidity and oil prices): Following the financial crisis,
oil prices recovered and then rose significantly upon the advent of the Arab Spring in late
2010, despite a continued physical-market glut. Prices fell back only after the geopolitical
status quo ante was restored in mid 2014 (when Egyptian President El-Sisi took office),
and only partially, as the Yemen war resurrected part of the geopolitical risk premium.
Figure 1 also illustrates the significant growth in Saudi Arabia’s reserves during the
period of Arab Spring turbulence and political uncertainty (December 2010 to June 2014),
which coincided, characteristically, with accelerating global financial liquidity. The com-
bination of low oil revenues and increased costs of the Yemen war and other military
spending has caused Saudi Arabia and other major oil exporters to reverse their contribu-
tions to global financial liquidity, at a time when the Federal Reserve had begun to reverse
its policy of quantitative easing. Thus, it is clear that one cannot understand the domestic
and regional prospects of Middle East economies, and their inevitable global spillover
effects, without understanding the joint interactions of oil prices, financial liquidity, and
geopolitical risk. Moreover, as we have already suggested in this introduction, causality
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runs in both directions for all bivariate and trivariate combinations of those variables.
Our GVAR framework allows us to investigate the domestic and global simultaneous
and lagged effects of those interactions.
Because the United States (U.S.) has the largest economy, financial sector, and military,
our baseline model uses the U.S. as the reference country for global financial liquidity
and geopolitical risk. Technically, we assume that the U.S. is the only country that can
unilaterally influence each of those two global variables of interest, while the remaining
fifty two countries are affected by those global variables but can only influence them
collectively. Motivated by the results of Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016) on the long-term
effect of Saudi production shocks on prices, we model oil prices as endogenous to Saudi
Arabia. This is also consistent with the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) recent
analysis,4 which highlights the endogeneity of oil prices for Saudi Arabia. The literature
on market power of Saudi Arabia, and the OPEC cartel that it leads, has also generally
agreed with the view that they have exercised market power to keep prices higher than
they would be otherwise; c.f. Golombek et al. (2018) and the references therein.
In Appendix A.2, we consider a robustness check on our main analysis by differentiating
between demand and supply driven oil price shocks, using the identification strategy of
Cashin et al. (2014), based on sign restrictions, finding that our main results continue to
hold, although the results for negative oil shocks without sign restrictions resemble more
closely the results under supply-driven oil price decline, which has been the most im-
portant development in oil markets over the past decade. We also conducted robustness
checks to the assumption of oil prices being endogenous for Saudi Arabia, by allowing it
to be endogenous instead in the U.S. or in the collective GCC. Although we would have
liked to conduct an additional robustness check forcing oil prices to be exogenous for
all countries, numerical instability of the model did not allow us to do so. Nonetheless,
coefficients of domestic variables in the oil price equation in the baseline and robust-
ness check models, which allowed, but did not force, oil prices to be endogenous in
Saudi Arabia and the U.S., respectively, were mostly statistically insignificant, which
explains, in part, why our results were invariant to this specification. We note also that,
unlike Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016), who included country-specific productions in their
4https://www.eia.gov/finance/markets/crudeoil/supply-opec.php, accessed on April 30,
2019; the first graph is entitled: “Changes in Saudi Arabia crude oil production can affect oil prices.”
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model, our analysis is restricted to global effects, which means that we are unable to study
the effect, for example, of geopolitical risk shocks on any specific country’s oil production.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We summarize some of the notable recent
contributions in the literature to understanding the causal mechanisms underlying
our GVAR analysis in Section 2. We describe the data and highlight the stylized facts
motivating our analysis in Section 3. We provide a brief description of the econometric
methodology and model specification in Section 4. The main empirical results are
summarized in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Literature on Interactions of Oil Prices, Financial Liquidity, and Geopolitics
The largest extant literature on links between global financial conditions and oil markets
has focused on the traditional causal links from oil supply shocks to economic activ-
ity and financial markets (Bernanke, 1983; Hamilton, 2003; Kilian, 2008, 2009; Jo, 2014,
for example). This literature began by investigating the effect of ostensibly exogenous
oil price shocks on aggregate economic activity, but progressed to more sophisticated
analysis that differentiated between supply and demand driven oil-price movements,
and to consider feedback effects through financial market booms and busts. However,
some of the earlier results in this literature have not withstood the test of time. For
example, Miller and Ratti (2009) have suggested that the previously detected strong link
between stock market and oil market bubbles during the 1980s and 1990s had broken
down in the 2000s. Likewise, Alsalman (2016) has found no effect of oil-price uncertainty
on US financial market returns in recent years, although sectoral stocks were, in fact,
differentially affected by directional movements in oil prices. Similarly, Arouri et al.
(2012) have found differentially significant effects of oil-price fluctuation on sectoral
stock returns in European markets.
The reverse link, from economic activity and financial market conditions, especially
speculative behavior by investors, to oil prices, has also been extensively studied, for
example, in Kilian and Murphy (2014); Askari and Krichene (2008); Chevillon and Rif-
flart (2009); Coleman (2012); Cifarelli and Paladino (2010); and Ratti and Vespignani
(2013), although the feedback mechanism from oil prices through contributions to global
financial liquidity was not a focal point of this research. A series of papers using money
supply as a proxy for global financial liquidity (Belke, Bordon and Hendricks, 2010; Belke,
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Orth and Setzer, 2010; Belke et al., 2012), including the use of GVAR methodology in the
last paper, point to this link from liquidity to inflation in commodity and asset prices,
as documented historically in Kindleberger and Aliber (2005), who stipulated, along
with Minsky (1982), the economic laws that (i) there can be no inflation without mon-
etary expansion, and (ii) there cannot be an asset market bubble without credit expansion.
We seek to contribute to this literature by formally including geopolitical risk factors in
the analysis of interactions between oil prices and global financial liquidity. Although
our modeling methodology is reduced form, like the literature reviewed above, the
theoretical and empirical literatures on potential causal mechanisms from oil prices to
geopolitical risk, and vice versa, inform our analysis. In this regard, although research
by Ross (2006) and Cotet and Tsui (2013), for example, shows that oil-export dependence
of an economy does not necessarily cause political violence, it does make the state an
attractive target for extralegal activity, which, combined with state weakness, may indeed
result in increased geopolitical risk. Unfortunately, states can be attacked through acts of
random violence against civilians, which result in reductions in tourism, investment, and
overall trust in the government, contributing further to economic pressure on the latter.
In the meantime, reduced commodity prices strain the fiscal abilities of governments
to reduce dissent and increase security through public spending on welfare and law
enforcement, respectively. In this regard, studies by Dube and Vargas (2013) and Miguel
et al. (2004), for example, have shown, respectively, how low commodity prices have
intensified civil conflict in Columbia, and how commodity-price-driven negative growth
shocks have led to increased civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.
Finally, there is a growing literature investigating the causal direction from intensified
geopolitical risk to oil prices, although Blomberg et al. (2009) have found that the de-
clining market power of OPEC in recent years has reduced the magnitudes of resulting
geopolitical risk premia in oil prices. Nonetheless, as Lee (2016) has argued, major oil
producers, especially in the Middle East, which is the focus of our attention in this
paper, remain particularly attractive targets for terrorists, because significant economic
harm can result from a major disruption of oil production and/or transport from the
region. Thus, Noguera-Santaella (2016) found a strong positive effect of geopolitical
strife (measured by event analysis using a limited list of 32 major events culminating
in the Arab Spring period) on oil prices, although, as already noted in the above cited
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studies, the effect has become less pronounced in recent years. We aim to contribute also
to this literature by incorporating in our analysis the secondary effects of geopolitical
risk on oil prices, through the financial-liquidity channel influenced by petrodollar flows
and reverse flows. We also use a more continuous measure of global geopolitical risk
levels, which is conducive to incorporation in our GVAR analysis.
Thus, our study follows the traditional time series analysis methods of earlier literatures
that had investigated each pairwise interaction between our three sets of variables: oil
prices, global financial liquidity, and geopolitical risk. The innovation in this paper is
to bring all three factors together with measures of economic activity (gross domestic
product, investment, and trade) to study the feedback effects of the global cycle of
our three variables of interest, as discussed in the introduction, both at the global and
country levels. Although we consider the distinction between oil price shocks caused by
supply and demand in our robustness checks in Appendix A.2, using the sign restrictions
suggested in Cashin et al. (2014), by adding worldwide oil supply as a global variable,
we do not explicitly model oil supply and demand at the country level in our GVAR, to
keep the model tractable – computationally and conceptually.
3. Data and preliminary analysis
For the country-specific component of our analysis, we use quarterly data from the first
quarter of 1979 to the second quarter of 2017 for the 53 countries listed alphabetically in
Table B.1. The bulk of this data is obtained through DataStream. For countries wherein
GDP data were not available, we used industrial production as a proxy for GDP. For
investment in each country, we used gross capital formation series. International reserves
are the official reported figures for each country. To construct the weighting matrix
described in Section 4, we used official bilateral trade data.
For the three main global variables in our analysis: Brent price of crude oil (in USD per
Barrel) was the obvious first choice. For our measure of global financial liquidity, instead
of following the literature cited in Section 2, which has generally used money supply
measure M2 as a proxy for financial liquidity, we decided to follow the logic champi-
oned by the BIS, c.f. Caruana (2014), and used the BIS series (Bank for International
Settlements, March 2017) for credit from all sectors to the private non-financial sector
as our measure of global financial liquidity. For our measure of global geopolitical risk,
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we used the index constructed by Caldara and Iacoviello (2016) constructed from news
article data. Where available, we also used the Caldara and Iacoviello country-level
geopolitical risk index for various countries. We estimated the global and country-level
models simultaneously using the Global Vector Autoregression (GVAR) model described
in some detail in Section 4.
As a first investigation toward the general expected results, we check two simple cor-
relations. The first correlation between global financial liquidity and Brent prices is
expected to be positive, with causation working in both directions (high financial liq-
uidity contributes to speculation on commodity prices, including oil, and petrodollar
recycling flows contribute to high financial liquidity). In fact, the sample correlation
between quarterly year-on-year percentage changes in Brent and global liquidity is 0.17,
which is significant at the 5% level. The second total correlation between Brent prices
and global political risk is less obvious, because causation works in opposite ways for
the two directions (low oil prices may result in higher global political risk, but higher
political risk would result in higher oil prices). The total sample correlation between
quarterly year-on-year percentage changes in Brent prices and our global political risk
index is -0.18, which is also significant at the 5% level.
Figure 2 illustrates the comovements of the three main global series by showing four-
quarter moving averages (smoothing) of the annual percentage change (year-on-year)
for the series. The contemporaneous negative correlation between oil price changes and
geopolitical risk index changes is quite strongly evident. In the meantime, lagged effects
that may have contributed to the mutual perpetuation in the bivariate cycle require
investigation through the richer autoregression model. Nonetheless, we can note that the
contemporaneous positive correlation between oil prices and global liquidity becomes
much more pronounced in the later part of our sample, when the effects of speculative
investment in commodities became more pronounced.
Needless to say, a deeper understanding of the co-movements of our three global vari-
ables, and their interactions with various domestic variables of interest, will only be
obtained once we review the results of our GVAR model estimation in Section 5. In the
meantime, for one last intermediate check on our hypothesis, we report in Table 1 the
Wald statistics for Granger causality tests of various directions of causation between the
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three variables using a simple Vector Autoregression model on Hodrick-Prescott-filtered
data for the three variables. Except for the Granger-causal effect of lagged liquidity on
geopolitical risk, to which we shall return in Sections 5 and 6, the lagged effects of each
of our variables on the other two is statistical significant.
Figure 2: Four-Quarter Moving Averages of Annual Percentage Changes in Oil Prices, Geopolitical Risk Index,















1980 1990 2000 2010
Table 1: Granger causality test
Equation Oil price Liquidity Geo. Risks
Oil price - 23.000*** 48.000***
Liquidity 5.627*** - 2.584**
Geo. Risks 4.168*** 0.354 -
All 4.040*** 24.000*** 85.000***
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4. Econometric Model
4.1. GVAR Model
The GVAR model, originally proposed by Pesaran et al. (2004), consists of a set of country-
specific VAR models, which are conditioned on cross-country average weighted foreign
variables as well as unweighted global variables. The model is estimated on a country-
by-country basis and the estimated parameters are then stacked to form the global model
which can be used for scenario analysis through impulse response functions.
Formally, consider a system of N country-specific models each of which includes ki
variables over the time period T . Let xit be a ki × 1 vector of variables in individual
country i and time t models and construct xt = (x′1t, x
′
2t, . . . , x
′
Nt)
′ as a k × 1 vector of all
variables for all countries in the system at time t. A given country-specific equation
typically includes domestic (endogenous) variables xit alongside a k∗×1 vector of (weakly
exogenous) foreign variables x∗it. Using a k × x
∗ matrix of country-specific weights (W̃′i),









Φi1xi,t−` + Λi0x∗it +
qi∑
`=1
Λi`x∗i,t−` + εit (2)
where Φi1 and Λi` are ki × ki and ki × k∗i matrices of parameters to be estimated. pi and qi
are the lag orders of country i’s domestic and foreign variables, respectively, and εit are
ki × 1 vectors of idiosyncratic, serially uncorrelated, country-specific shocks.
Thus, a country-specific model contains a ki + k∗ vector zit = (x′it, x
∗′
it )
′ of domestic and




Ai`zit−` + εit (3)
where
5For simplicity, we drop deterministic terms and common effects when presenting country-specific VARX∗
models, but these can be easily added.
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Ai0 = (Iki,−Λi0), Ai` = (Φi`,Λi`) for ` = 1, 2, . . . , p
and p = maxi(pi, qi), Φi` = 0 for ` > pi, and Λi` = 0 for ` > qi
Using (ki + k∗) × k link matrices Wi = (E′i , W̃
′
i), where Ei is a k × ki selection matrix such
that xit = E′i xt, then
zit = Wixt (4)




Λi`Wixt−` + εt. (5)




G`xt−` + εt, (6)
where εt = (ε′1t, ε
′















F`xt−` + G−10 εt (7)
where Ft = G−10 G` for ` = 1, 2, . . . , p.
4.2. Model Specification
As discussed briefly in the introduction, GVAR modeling allows each global variable
to be endogenous only in one country. Even though the variable would be exogenous
for each of the remaining 52 countries, the latter can still influence that global variable
collectively. Our modeling strategy in this paper is to consider global financial liquidity
and geopolitical risk to be endogenous to the United States, because of the Dollar’s
continued status as global currency and the Federal Reserve Bank’s prominence in global
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Monetary policy, as well as the prominence of U.S. direct military and indirect policy
influence throughout the world. For oil prices, we followed Mohaddes and Pesaran
(2016) and the Energy Information Agency’s April 2019 view that Saudi production levels
can unilaterally influence global oil prices.6 In Appendix A.2.3, we report the results
from alternative model endogeneity specifications, including those in Cashin et al. (2014)
and find that our results are qualitatively robust to these assumptions.
5. Empirical Results
In order to capture possible unobserved common factors, the global component of our
GVAR model includes the cross-country averages of all endogenous variables. Moreover,
in order to estimate equation 2, our GVAR model assumes that the country-specific
foreign and global variables are weakly exogenous and I(1) (integrated of order one),
and that the parameters of the individual models are stable over time. To defend these
model specifications and assumptions, as well as to determine the lag orders for various
model components, we conducted a battery of diagnostic hypothesis tests.
We provide a brief summary of these diagnostic test results in Appendix A.1. Before-
estimation diagnostics include unit root tests, tests for lag order of the various models,
and cointegration tests. After-estimation diagnostics include tests of residual serial cor-
relation in VECMX models, as well as tests of weak exogeneity of foreign and global
variables in various country-level models. On the whole, our diagnostic tests support
our I(1), cointegration, and exogeneity assumptions under which we estimated the model.
The most insightful empirical results of our estimated GVAR are summarized in two
sections, 5.1 and 5.2, respectively, for global variables and country-level variables in
Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) countries. The latter are of particular interest
because they are simultaneously major contributors to global geopolitical risk, possessors
of economies that are particularly sensitive to oil prices, and frequent contributors to
global financial liquidity movements through petrodollar recycling (when oil prices are
high) and its reversal (when oil prices are low). The reported results in both subsections
take the form of generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) to shocks in each of our
three global variables (oil price, liquidity and geopolitical risks).
6https://www.eia.gov/finance/markets/crudeoil/.
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5.1. Dynamic analysis: Global shocks and responses
Throughout the remainder of this section, we report results of our estimated GVAR(2)
model graphically as plotted generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) for various
shocks and response variables. Each graph includes the median GIRF and its 95% confi-
dence interval from 5000 replications of the bootstrapped model. In this subsection, we
begin by studying shocks to each of our three global variables and the resulting GIRFs
for each of the other global variables.7
The GIRF graphs for the impacts on global liquidity and geopolitical risk from a one
standard deviation negative shock in oil prices are shown in Fig. 3. The first panel from
the left shows that, starting one year after the shock, geopolitical risk increases signifi-
cantly, around 1-to-2%, and persists in response to a one s.d. negative oil price shock.
This confirms our prior hypothesis that periods of low oil prices contribute to increased
geopolitical strife. In the meantime, the second panel shows that global financial liquidity
declines significantly (reaching 0.9% in about three quarters, and staying there), both
immediately and persistently, in response to a one s.d. negative oil price shock. This also
confirms our prior hypothesis that a decline in oil price reduces or reverses petrodollar
flows to the international financial system, thus decelerating global financial liquidity.
Figure 3: Impulse = One s.d. Negative Shock to Oil Price
Geopolitical risk GIRF Global Liquidity GIRF Oil Price GIRF
The GIRFs for the impacts on geopolitical risk and oil prices from a one s.d. negative
shock in global financial liquidity are shown in Fig. 4. The first panel shows that geopo-
litical risk response to the negative liquidity shock is statistically insignificant after the
second quarter. The third panel shows that oil prices are likely to drop (by approximately
7Some of the global-variable GIRFs in this section replicate the results reported in Abdel-Latif and El-Gamal
(2019) for a larger sample.
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Figure 4: Impulse = One s.d. Negative Shock to Global Financial Liquidity
Geopolitical risk GIRF Global Liquidity GIRF Oil Price GIRF
1%) in response to the negative shock in global financial liquidity. However, this effect
is also short-lived and statistically significant only for approximately three quarters.
Beyond that time horizon, investors who may have speculated on oil (along with other
commodity) prices during periods of accelerating financial liquidity growth switch to
other asset classes, and, thus, the effect of decelerating financial liquidity merely pricks
the bubble in oil prices, but does not result in long term suppression thereto, as long
term prices in the absence of wide speculative activity resume their normal path based
on supply and demand economic fundamentals.
Thus, although the effects of financial liquidity shocks have the signs that we had hy-
pothesized in the introduction, their isolated effects are not as statistically significant in
the medium to long term as the other two shocks (to oil prices and to geopolitical risk)
that we have considered earlier in the Section. We interpret this result (in Figure 4) to
suggest that tight monetary policy cannot materially affect oil prices and geopolitical
risk in the medium to long run: Although expansionary monetary policy does serve
as a catalyst in amplifying the cycle of increased oil prices, potentially for prolonged
periods through petrodollar recycling feedback, contractionary monetary policy results
in a one-time negative shock, as the speculative-investment component switches to other
asset classes.
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Figure 5: Impulse = One s.d. Positive Shock to Geopolitical Risk Index
Geopolitical risk GIRF Global Liquidity GIRF Oil Price GIRF
The GIRFs for the impacts on global liquidity and oil prices from a one standard deviation
positive shock in global geopolitical risk are shown in Fig. 5. The second panel shows a
persistently negative (approximately 0.1%) but statistically insignificant decline in global
financial liquidity, which is consistent with our Section 2 result of insignificant Wald
test statistic for the Granger-causal impact of geopolitical risk on global liquidity. The
third panel shows a persistently positive (approximately 4%) and statistically significant
response of oil prices to a one s.d. positive shock in geopolitical risk. This is consistent
with the second part of our motivational hypothesis on oil price and geopolitical risk
cycles: lower oil prices trigger higher geopolitical risk (as we have seen in the first panel
of Fig. 3), and the latter leads to later increases in oil prices, perpetuating the coupled
cycles of geopolitical risk and oil prices discussed in El-Gamal and Jaffe (2009, 2018).
5.2. Dynamic Analysis: MENA-Country-Specific Responses
We now focus primarily on the MENA region, which is particularly sensitive to oil prices,
both for oil exporting countries and their labor exporting neighbors, a major epicenter
of geopolitical risk factors, and a frequent contributor to financial liquidity changes
due to petrodollar recycling and its reversal.8 As we have done in the previous section,
we report results graphically in the form of median GIRFs and 95% confidence bands
generated through 5000 bootstrapping simulations from the GVAR(2) model.
MENA country GDP GIRFs to a one s.d. negative oil price shock are shown in Figure 6.
Median GDP GIRFs to oil price drops are generally negative for most countries in the
region, as we would expect. Moreover, the negative impact is persistent and statistically
8Oil exporting countries in the MENA region are Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Oman,
Bahrain, Qatar, Emirates.
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Figure 6: MENA GDP Response to One s.d. Negative Oil Price Shock
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Emirates Iran
Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Morocco
Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Tunisia Turkey
significant in countries that depend significantly on oil exports, namely, Algeria, Bahrain,
United Arab Emirates, Iran, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Interestingly, the
GIRF is also negative and statistically significant for Turkey, which has relied on petrodol-
lar flows to grow both its export and international investment markets. Comparing to
GIRFs for non-MENA countries, as shown in Figure C.2, we note that the dramatic direct
effects of negative oil shocks on the GDPs of Saudi Arabia are also observed for Brazil
and Chile (which is dependent on exports of other commodities), and the indirect effects
on Turkey’s GDP is somewhat similar to, albeit weaker than, that of Thailand, which
was, likewise, one of the major recipients of petrodollar-funded investments.
Figure 7 shows that investment GIRFs to a negative shock in oil prices are much more
uniformly persistent and statistically significant for oil exporters. The median GIRF is
also negative and significant for other MENA countries. This reflects the procyclical
nature of investment in MENA oil exporters, as investment programs serve to enhance
absorptive (or wealth sharing) capacity during boom years and their suspension helps to
ameliorate fiscal deficit problems during lean years. Figure C.3 in the Appendix shows
that investment in some other non-oil-exporting countries outside MENA, e.g. Italy and
Abdel-Latif and El-Gamal — Oil, Liquidity, and Geopolitics — July 29, 2019 19
Figure 7: MENA Investment Response to One s.d. Negative Oil Price Shock
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Emirates Iran
Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Morocco
Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Tunisia Turkey
Thailand, are also impacted significantly by negative oil shocks. Moreover, the impacts
on oil exporters outside MENA seem to vary by the degree of diversification of the
economy. Thus, the negative impact on investment is significant in Chile (which relies
heavily on commodity exports), but not in Brazil.
We report the GDP and investment GIRFs to a one s.d. increase in geopolitical risk,
respectively, in Figures 8 and 9. Not surprisingly, an increase in geopolitical risk is
associated with negative effects on GDP in most countries, and the effect is statistically
significant. In the meantime, with the exception of Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, we
do not observe the same negative and significant impact of geopolitical risk on invest-
ment. Outside of MENA, there are a number of other countries whose GDP GIRFs to
geopolitical risk shocks are negative and statistically significant, including Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia and New Zealand, U.S. and U.K., as shown in Figure
C.4. Consistent with the evidence for MENA, Figure C.5 shows that investment in non-
MENA countries is much more resilient to geopolitical risk shocks, and is not affected in
the same manner as GDP.
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Figure 8: MENA Country GDP Response to One s.d. Geopolitical Risk Shock
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Emirates Iran
Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Morocco
Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Tunisia Turkey
The GIRFs reported in Fig. 9 show that investments in the MENA countries (except
for Israel) are expected to drop as a result of a positive shock to geopolitical risks. For
example investment is likely to drop by 0.4% in Bahrain, 0.1% in Jordan, 0.15% in Kuwait,
0.1% in Lebanon, 1% in Oman, 2% in Qatar, and by in 0.04% in Tunisia. Although
investment drops are likely to be the case in other MENA countries as well, the plotted
GIRFs in Fig. 9 suggest that such response is not statistically significant in most MENA
countries.
Figures 10 and 11 show, respectively, the GIRFs of GDP and investment to a negative
shock to global financial liquidity. Although we estimate that a negative liquidity shock
would have short-lived negative effects on GDP in Saudi Arabia and significant effects
on Egypt, Morocco and Turkey (the first a major provider of global liquidity through
petrodollar recycling, and the latter three recipients of significant portions of petrodol-
lar investment and spending), most MENA countries’ GDPs do not react significantly
negatively to negative financial liquidity shocks. The main notable exception among
oil-exporting countries is Bahrain, whose GDP declines very significantly as a conse-
quence of a negative financial liquidity shock, in large part because of its specialization
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Figure 9: MENA Country Investment Response to One s.d. Geopolitical Risk Shock
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Emirates Iran
Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Morocco
Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Tunisia Turkey
in petrodollar recycling as a financial hub.
GIRFs in Figure C.6 show a similar pattern of only brief or no significant effect of a
negative financial liquidity shock on most countries’ GDPs. In this regard, Bahrain’s
GDP-dependence on financial liquidity is the obvious anomaly throughout our sample.
Investment in MENA countries is generally not affected significantly by a negative liq-
uidity shock, with the exceptions of the effects in Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. Likewise,
Figure C.7 shows that the effect of a negative liquidity shock is minimal and short lived
in most countries outside MENA, with the notable exception of Luxembourg, whose
role as an international financial center makes its investment significantly dependent on
financial liquidity, like Bahrain’s GDP.
Before we close this section, we consider the current historical episode and its potential
effects on Saudi investment and GDP. As we have seen in Figure 6, Saudi GDP was the
most negatively affected by negative oil price shocks. In the meantime, we have seen
in the first panel of Figure 3 and the second panel of Figure 5, respectively, that low
oil prices lead to heightened geopolitical risk, and the latter, in turn, leads to higher oil
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Figure 10: MENA Country GDP Response to One s.d. Negative Financial Liquidity Shock
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Emirates Iran
Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Morocco
Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Tunisia Turkey
Figure 11: MENA Country Investment Response to One s.d. Negative Financial Liquidity Shock
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Emirates Iran
Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Morocco
Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Tunisia Turkey
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prices. Indeed, this was evident in our motivational Figure 1: The decline in oil prices
following the financial crisis contributed to the revolutionary wave, including the Arab
Spring, which, in turn, added a very significant geopolitical risk premium to oil prices.
Once the Arab Spring revolts ended, oil prices fell dramatically, but the fiscal pressure
this put on the Yemeni government, which depended on oil exports for the bulk of its
revenues and exports, contributed to success of Houthi rebels, and the ensuing war. The
war, in turn, has contributed to a partial rebound in oil prices, as risk increased for tanker
traffic through the strait of Bab El-Mandab.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is embarking on a remarkably ambitious program to
reconfigure its economy away from dependence on oil, in what is known as Vision 2030
and the shorter-term Transformation Program. The program requires a massive infusion
of investment spending to build the non-oil sector of the Saudi economy, but this requires
fast swimming against the natural tide of the economy. Indeed, data until the time of
writing show a contracting GDP in the Saudi non-oil sector, which has been historically
derivative of the oil sector. Furthermore, Figure 12 shows that the resulting decline in
private Saudi investment is likely to cause further significant decline in Saudi GDP.
Figure 12: Saudi GDP Response to One s.d. Negative Shock to Saudi Investment
Saudi GDP GIRF
Needless to say, our econometric estimates are driven by patterns in historical data, while
the bold Saudi Vision promises a dramatic break with historical norms, including massive
public investments that may counterbalance the short-term decline in private investment,
and spur long-term private investment that benefits from planned infrastructure projects.
Nonetheless, the estimated GIRFs contain valuable information on private sector invest-
ment and economic activity responses to low oil prices, and this information suggests
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that the envisioned plan’s chances of success are not high, especially as the increased
elasticity of U.S. tight-oil supply has prevented oil prices from rising significantly.
6. Conclusion
The simple VAR-based Granger-causality test conducted in Section 3 confirmed our
hypothesis that the triad of oil prices, geopolitical risk, and financial liquidity are closely
linked in a self perpetuating cycle. Our primary GVAR model in Section 5 assumed that
the U.S. was the only country that can unilaterally influence global financial liquidity and
geopolitical risk, and that Saudi Arabia was the only country that can unilaterally influ-
ence oil prices, but the large number of countries in our sample were allowed collectively
to influence all three global variables. Generalized impulse response functions from the
GVAR model confirm our hypothesis that a negative shock to oil prices results in higher
geopolitical risk and lower global financial liquidity, as petrodollar recycling decelerates
or reverses direction. The GIRFs also show that a positive shock to geopolitical risk
results in higher oil prices.
Thus, we reconfirm the perpetuation of the cycle of low oil prices (e.g. in the late 1980s)
leading to geopolitical strife (e.g. first Iraq War), which, in turn, leads to higher oil prices.
We also confirm the catalytic role of financial liquidity in accelerating oil price bubbles
and crashes, as petrodollar recycling fuels speculative demand for all commodities,
including oil. This effect is asymmetric, as we have also shown that negative shocks
to financial liquidity, including due to lower oil prices and deceleration or reversal of
petrodollar recycling, does not result in secondary longer term reduction in oil prices. Ro-
bustness checks that allow for differential effects of supply vs. demand-driven oil-price
shocks, following the methodology of Cashin et al. (2014) reconfirmed that the results of
our baseline GVAR model are not sensitive to these considerations, although the baseline
results resemble more closely the results from a supply-driven negative shock to oil
prices, which is consistent with the increasing market effect of unconventional oil over
the past decade.
The full power of our GVAR analysis is exhibited in its ability to study the effects of global
variables on individual country variables, as well as the collective effects of country-level
variable changes on global variables. In this regard, we focused our attention on the most
likely scenario given global variable dynamics, which is a prolonged period of relatively
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moderate oil prices, moderately heightened geopolitical risk, and relatively constant or
decelerating financial liquidity growth. Under this scenario, we found that, as long as
historical evidence remains a good guide for the future, countries heavily dependent on
oil exports, like Saudi Arabia, are unlikely to succeed in generating significant economic
growth in other sectors to compensate for the inevitable economic downturn.
The conclusions of our empirical analysis are at once sobering and cautionary. In the
absence of any major global shocks, the current conditions of moderate oil prices, moder-
ately heightened geopolitical risk, and moderate to high financial liquidity are likely to
persist, and call for accommodation of the long-term realities of slower global growth,
reduced security, and lower standards of living in oil-exporting countries. A heightening
of geopolitical risk, which may be caused by direct intervention or reaction to the in-
evitable lower standards of living in MENA countries, may propel another phase of the
cycle of higher oil prices, acceleration through financial liquidity, and a brief reduction
in geopolitical risk. However, reversion to the long-term “new normal” is likely to
follow soon, and to be more painful than the last phase. Wise management and lowered
expectations may be the most advisable social and economic policies to manage a soft
landing following the past half-century of petrodollars, financial crises, and wars.
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Appendices
Abdel-Latif and El-Gamal — Oil, Liquidity, and Geopolitics — APPENDIX Ai
A Diagnostics and Robustness
A.1 Diagnostic Tests
We examine the integration properties of our series using the Augmented Dickey
Fuller (ADF) unit root test on the level (with and without trend) as well as on
first differences of all variables. Since unit root tests are inherently of low power,
we also perform the weighted symmetric ADF test (ADF-WS) proposed by Park
and Fuller (1995). For space considerations, we report here only the ADF test
results. Table B.3 lists the results of the ADF tests for our three global variables
(oil price, GPR, liquidity), which justify the assumption that those variables
are integrated of order one. ADF test results for each country’s domestic and
foreign variables, respectively, are reported in Tables B.4 and B.5. With very few
exceptions (e.g. for investment in a handful of countries, where the order of
integration may be higher), the I(1) assumption is also justified for virtually all
country-variable pairs in our model.
Table B.6 lists the results of our various country-level test for the order of the
VARX models and the number of cointegrating relationships therein, based on
the maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics at the 5% significance level. All
country-specific models are estimated to have either one or two cointegrating
relationships.
Table B.7 lists the various F-statistics (indicating significance at the 5% level) by
country and variable for tests of residual-serial-correlation in VECMX models.
We fail to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation for almost all country
and variable pairs.
Table B.8 lists the results of F tests of the weak exogeneity of foreign and global
variables in each country-level model. This exogeneity is an essential assump-
tion for the validity of our GVAR model, because it precludes any long-term
feedback effects from the endogenous variables to the foreign or global vari-
ables. The formal tests of weak exogeneity were conducted by testing the joint
significance of estimated error-correction terms in auxiliary regressions wherein
foreign and global variables are included in the various country-variable aux-
iliary regressions as if they were endogenous. Almost all the F tests for these
various country-variable regressions fail to reject the null hypothesis of R2 = 0
in the corresponding auxiliary regression.
Finally, Figure C.1 shows the persistence profiles of our estimated model, show-
ing high speeds of convergence to long-term equilibrium relationships, thus
confirming the validity of our estimated cointegrating vectors (Pesaran and
Shin, 1996). In this regard, eigenvalues of the constructed GVAR were forced to
lie on or within the unit circle, to ensure model convergence, but the estimated
rate of convergence was not restricted. The resulting estimates of persistence
profiles shows convergence to the long-term relationships within two to three
years, which is quite fast, thus suggesting that our model specification is valid
for the set of modeled variables.
A.2 Robustness Checks
In our preceding analysis, we considered the effects of oil price negative shocks
on global financial liquidity and geopolitical risks without any attempt to iden-
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tify whether oil price drops are caused by supply or demand shocks. Although
it is not the main purpose of this study, one can argue that we should identify
the source of the oil price shock (i.e., whether it is demand driven or supply
driven). The latter was important in earlier studies that focused on positive
oil shocks that were driven by growth-induced demand vs. supply disrup-
tions. Our interest is mainly on the effect of negative oil price shocks on MENA
economies, which as we shall see in this section, is not as sensitive to supply vs.
demand considerations.
To conduct our robustness check, we follow the identification strategy of Cashin
et al. (2014), wherein they used data on oil price and oil production along with
a set of sign restrictions within a GVAR framework. Therefore, we add oil
production (qoil) as a fourth global variable into our GVAR model. Using a set
of sign restrictions on the model’s impulse responses, we devise two scenarios
(supply-driven or demand-driven) in which oil price would fall. First, a positive
supply shock is constructed as (i) a drop in oil price (poil < 0) and (ii) an increase
in global oil production levels (qoil > 0). Second, a negative demand shock is
one in which the demand curve shift to the left causing a drop in both (i) oil
price (poil < 0) and (ii) oil production (qoil < 0). We impose the restrictions
that these sign combinations in each scenario hold for four quarters after the
shocks. Since we are interested in how geopolitical risk and global liquidity
react to oil price fall (whether demand driven or supply driven), we do not
impose restrictions on other global variables in the system. Following Fry and
Pagan (2011), we report here the single model that produced impulse responses
as close to the median values of the impulse vector as possible (this is called the
median target). It is important to recognize that the distribution here is across
different models and is not a consequence of sampling uncertainty.
A.2.1 Demand-driven negative oil price shock:
We use our GVAR model along with the above sign restrictions to stimulate
a negative demand shock to oil prices. This is motivated by recent falls in oil
prices which have been explained, at least in part, by declined forecast of oil
demand as a result of improved efficiency, environmental regulations, especially
in the transportation and power generation sectors, and sluggish global growth.
A negative demand shock implies a leftward shift of demand curve causing both
oil price and production to fall. We impose these restrictions on the impulse
response functions. Figure C.8 shows the GIRFs for our four global variable
to a negative demand shock. Consistent with our results reported in the main
text, Figure C.8 shows that a demand driven oil price shock is likely to cause
heightened geopolitical risks and deceleration in global financial liquidity. We
also report the MENA countries individual GIRFs for GDP and investment as
a result to a negative oil demand shock (see Fig. C.9 and C.10). These results
also confirm our previous findings of negative effects on GDP and investment
in MENA region, as reported in Figures 6 and 7, although the negative effects
are not as long lived for most MENA countries under the sign restrictions of a
demand-driven negative shock to oil prices.
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A.2.2 Supply-driven negative oil price shock:
Of course, the more important source of lower oil prices in recent years has been
the growth of non-conventional oil production, especially in the United States,
which has begun to produce more oil than Russia and Saudi Arabia, and is
poised to become a net exporter in the near future. In this subsection, we report
GIRFs for global variables as well as MENA-country GDP and investment
under the sign restrictions of higher oil supply and lower prices. Figure C.11
shows the GIRFs for our four global variables following a positive supply
shock that lowers oil prices. As before, it shows that a supply driven oil price
decline is likely to lead to an increase in geopolitical risks and deceleration of
financial liquidity, which is again consistent with our baseline-model findings
without the sign restrictions. We also report the MENA countries individual
GIRFs for GDP and investment as a result to a positive oil supply shock (see
Fig. C.12 and C.13). These results mirror those reported in Figures 6 and 7
in the main text, showing significant decline in output and investment in oil-
producing countries and countries like Turkey, which depend on petrodollars
for investment. The stronger resemblance of supply-driven negative oil price
shocks to the unconstrained baseline case is not surprising, since the dominant
story in oil markets over the past decade has been the rise of non-conventional
oil production, especially in the U.S.
A.2.3 Alternative assumptions on global variables:
Our baseline model treated oil prices as endogenously determined within the
Saudi Arabia model but exogenous to all other countries. Similarly, geopo-
litical risk and global financial liquidity variables were treated as exogenous
to all country models except the U.S. The oil price endogeneity specification
was motivated by the fact that Saudi Arabia is the largest oil exporter, and its
production decisions were recognized in recent EIA analysis to affect prices,
and the financial liquidity and geopolitical risk endogeneity specifications were
motivated by the sheer size and development of the U.S. economy, financial
sector, and military.
As a robustness check, we estimated an alternative GVAR model in which
global variables specification follows that of Cashin et al. (2014). Specifically,
we consider four global variables: oil price, global oil production, geopolitical
risk and global financial liquidity, and we group the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) countries into a single region. Since these countries are major exporting
countries, we include oil production as endogenous in GCC region model,
and exogenous in all other country models. Moreover, following Cashin et al.
(2014), who show the importance of the U.S. oil consumption which exerts
an influence on price, we include oil price as endogenous in the U.S. country
model. Finally, we impose sign restrictions on the impulse response functions
as follows: negative oil demand shock is defined as poil < 0 and qoil < 0,
and positive oil supply shock is defined as poil < 0 and qoil > 0. Finally,
a positive GRP shock is defined by sign restrictions GRP > 0 and qoil < 0.
We report the GIRFs for these shocks in figures C.14, C.15 and C.16, showing
similar results to our baseline model. In an earlier versions of the paper, we
had specified all three global variables (oil price, geopolitical risk and financial
liquidity) as endogenous only in the US model. The results of this model were
still qualitatively similar. Thus, we conclude that our results are robust to the
endogeneity modeling specification.
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B Tables
Table B.1: Country List
Algeria Denmark Indonesia Mexico South Korea
Argentina Ecuador Iran Morocco Spain
Australia Egypt Ireland Netherlands Sweden
Austria El Salvador Israel New Zealand Switzerland
Bahrain Emirates Italy Norway Thailand
Belgium Finland Japan Oman Tunisia
Brazil France Jordan Philippines Turkey
Canada Germany Kuwait Portugal UK
Chile Greece Lebanon Qatar US
China Hungary Luxembourg Saudi Arabia
Colombia India Malaysia Singapore
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Table B.3: Unit Root Tests for the Global Variables
oil price GPR Lq Oil Production
Global trend no trend Dpoil trend no trend DGPR trend no trend DLq trend no trend Dqoil
Critical Val. -3.24 -2.89 -2.89 -3.45 -2.89 -2.89 -3.45 -2.89 -2.89 -3.45 -2.89 -2.89
Statistic -1.99 -0.99 -6.72** -2.82 -2.82 -7** -1.08 -2.01 -8.52** 0.63 -1.03 -4.56**
Table B.4: Unit Root Tests for Domestic Variables
Y I Rs
trend no trend DY trend no trend DI trend no trend DRs
DZA -3.17 -0.91 -5.54** -1.6 -2.26 -0.72 -1.92 -0.03 -8.44**
ARG -2.72 -0.87 -6.31** -3.3 -1.64 -4.41** -2.71 -1.19 -10.09**
AUS -5.69** -1.12 -8.45** -1.74 -1.21 -9.87** -3.36 -2.52 -9.27**
AUT -3.27 -1.25 -7.9** -2.03 -0.36 -11.69** -1.64 -1.82 -10.04**
BHR -4.24** -3.28 -8.05** -1.64 -0.38 -12.28** -2.51 -1.51 -8.73**
BEL -2.77 -0.27 -8.51** -2.72 -0.47 -7.06** -2.23 -1.96 -6.82**
BRA -2.09 -1.24 -11.5** -2.71 -1.05 -5.8** -3.1 -0.4 -7.19**
CAN -3.32 -0.4 -9.47** -7.94** -0.88 -5.81** -2.03 -0.89 -10.17**
CHL -2.41 -0.25 -5.5** -2.62 -1.09 -10.25** -4** -2 -9.37**
CHN -10.31** -0.07 -11.31** 1.45 -2.21 -6.9** -2.76 -1.88 -5.85**
COL -2.73 -0.64 -8.06** -2.06 -1.27 -4.48** -4.16** -0.8 -4**
DNK -1.66 -1.62 -8.51** -2.01 -2.25 -6.04** -2.84 -1.42 -7.63**
ECU -6.54** -1.62 -8.16** -1.92 -1.66 -2.28 -3.31 -1.44 -6.21**
EGY -3.14 -1.06 -9.05** -2 -0.33 -4.55** -0.78 -1.49 -6.18**
SLV -2.49 -0.9 -6.75** -2.06 0.47 -7.11** -4.34** -1.34 -7.28**
ARE -2.03 -1.65 -5.86** -2.33 -0.97 -6.58** -1.43 -1.32 -8.46**
FIN -1.17 -1.72 -6.46** -3.13 -1.96 -11.07** -2.25 -2.15 -7.99**
FRA -1.53 -1.66 -8.22** -2.53 -2.67 -12.96** -4.35** -2.45 -6.98**
DEU -3.81** -1.1 -9.79** -1.99 -1.01 -10.3** -1.77 -1.73 -6.64**
GRC -1.92 -1.91 -4.94** -2.33 -1.51 -3.48** -1.5 -1.49 -9.41**
HUN -1.8 -0.83 -4.29** -4.37** -1.52 -6.42** 0 0 0
IND -6.09** -1.25 -9.39** -1.15 -0.81 -7.91** -1.91 -0.95 -6.26**
IDN -1.77 -0.91 -10.03** -1.65 -2.39 -6.31** 0.49 -1.59 -1.33
IRN -3.06 -2.51 -8.45** -2.5 -1.58 -5.11** 0 0 0
IRL -2.4 -0.73 -10.01** -1.96 -0.16 -8.32** -0.48 -0.93 -6.25**
ISR -3.33 -1.1 -8.64** -12.17** -13.78** -3.99** -2.43 -0.81 -9.61**
ITA -1.4 -1.8 -8.74** -2.2 -3.82** -12.48** -1.18 0.04 -3.8**
JPN -2.48 -2.82 -7.59** -1.61 -2.04 -8.07** 2.13 -1.4 -1.52
JOR -2.72 -2.44 -9.92** -2.5 -1.18 -5.43** -3.15 -0.74 -5.43**
KWT -4.68** -2.41 -16.46** -2.04 -0.24 -9.97** -0.91 -1.83 -2.46
LBN -3.03 -1.37 -9.98** -3.04 -2.18 -8.64** -2.76 0.22 -5.39**
LUX -2.27 -1.19 -7.58** -3.15 -1.41 -9.37** -2.53 -0.74 -11.33**
MYS -1.19 -1.77 -11.19** -1.44 -1.92 -7.38** -1.42 -1.09 -8.31**
MEX -2.84 -1 -7.94** -3.69** -1.05 -7.14** -4.49** -1.68 -7.93**
MAR -2.65 -0.6 -10.19** -2.21 -0.94 -5.43** -1.64 -0.58 -15.47**
NLD -2.81 -0.76 -10.87** -2.63 -0.73 -10.35** -1.7 -1.83 -5.3**
NZL -3.33 -3.91** -8.89** -3.82** -0.89 -6.89** -1.99 -1.72 -7.31**
NOR -0.91 -2.17 -12.47** -1.74 -0.38 -5.9** -2.77 -2 -10.56**
OMN -1.93 -3.95** -8.77** -1.78 -0.63 -9.17** -3.29 -0.57 -8.3**
PHL -2.71 -1.33 -5.36** -7.26** -1.39 -6.25** -3.24 -0.44 -6.23**
PRT -1.43 -2.48 -11.32** -1.32 -1.46 -5.43** -1.2 -1.21 -8.97**
QAT -3.21 -1.32 -8.17** -3.49** -1.45 -5.47** -1.7 0.48 -9.96**
SAU -3.28 -2.33 -9.44** -2.73 -1.58 -3.85** -1.27 0.02 -7.99**
SGP -1.95 0.81 -8.35** -1.69 -1.78 -12.76** -0.53 -2.93 -11.21**
KOR -1.1 -1.87 -11.89** -1.43 -2.03 -5.93** -1.29 -1.02 -5.19**
ESP -1.22 -1.68 -8.08** -1.32 -1.43 -4.64** -1.75 -1.74 -6.84**
SWE -1.45 -1.48 -5.66** -5.88** -0.89 -6.87** -1.58 -1.18 -11.01**
CHE -5.07** -5.16** -6.16** -2.36 -1.77 -8.76** -1.75 -0.09 -3.87**
THA -5.1** -4.52** -8.57** -2.08 -2.09 -5.84** -1.1 -1.46 -4**
TUN -2.42 -2.28 -10.28** -1.2 -0.87 -9.41** -2.87 -1.06 -3.6**
TUR -3.41 -0.98 -7.31** -2.62 -1.33 -7.59** -1.67 -1.45 -10.03**
GBR -1.11 -1.44 -6.56** -2.32 -1.07 -6.62** -1.78 -0.17 -7.72**
USA -1.66 -0.98 -9.67** -0.9 -2.33 -13.26** -2.49 -2.43 -9.85**
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Table B.5: Unit Root Tests for Country-Specific Foreign Variables
Ys Is Rss
trend no trend Dys trend no trend Dis trend no trend DRss
-3.45 -2.89 -2.89 -3.45 -2.89 -2.89 -3.45 -2.89 -2.89
-1.64 -0.94 -11.09** -0.6 -1.66 -11.71** -1.61 -0.68 -9.2**
-3.4 -0.14 -10.15** -0.36 -1.15 -4.47** -1.81 -0.91 -9.4**
-2.74 -0.16 -10.71** 0.84 -2.41 -9.99** 2.39 -1.93 -6.38**
-2.99 -0.88 -10.44** -2.17 -0.72 -6.06** -1.78 -0.76 -9.41**
-2.65 -0.22 -7.67** -4.53** -4.29** -6.31** -1.03 -0.66 -8.49**
-2.27 -1.03 -10.59** -0.89 -2.01 -12.11** -1.96 -1.03 -9.65**
-3.26 0.03 -10.94** 0.9 -1.89 -10.5** -0.78 -1.53 -10.27**
-1.74 -0.82 -8** -0.12 -2.62 -13.39** -2.03 -2.24 -10.26**
-2.85 -0.15 -10.89** 1.13 -2.29 -10.26** 1.07 -1.98 -9.33**
-2.32 -0.96 -10.58** -0.55 -1.72 -12.85** -0.06 -1.91 -8.4**
-2.14 -0.59 -9.06** 0.24 -2.69 -10.56** -1.96 -1.75 -10.94**
-1.62 -0.89 -9.22** -2.2 -0.69 -6.06** -1.65 -1.29 -9.75**
-2.05 -0.77 -7.83** 0.5 -1.82 -11.37** -1.98 -1.84 -11.29**
-1.67 -0.7 -10.22** -0.61 -1.91 -11.41** -2.74 -0.36 -11.02**
-1.71 -0.96 -9.72** -0.66 -1.94 -13.06** -2.14 -2.26 -10.19**
-4.4** -0.92 -10.81** -0.91 -1.69 -10.35** 1.48 -1.44 -5.29**
-2.02 -0.67 -9.11** -1.03 -1.25 -10.79** -1.59 -1.48 -9.9**
-2.6 -0.71 -8.7** -0.59 -1.54 -11.41** -1.61 -0.59 -9.39**
-2.1 -0.65 -9.16** -0.59 -1.57 -11.76** -1.86 -1.13 -9.98**
-2.5 -0.89 -8.8** -0.68 -2.65 -10.44** -2 -0.54 -9.64**
-2.55 -0.98 -10.46** -0.72 -2.17 -12.03** -1.7 -1.13 -9.7**
-3.06 0.11 -10.5** -0.59 -0.74 -6.85** -0.42 -2.19 -6.76**
-3.93** -0.17 -9.67** 0.25 -2.1 -11.78** 1.99 -1.91 -7.73**
-3.39 -0.25 -10.97** 0.71 -2.4 -10.69** 0.91 -2.06 -8.75**
-2.31 -0.9 -10.66** -0.84 -1.52 -11.4** -1.67 -1.09 -6.07**
-2.25 -0.68 -8.89** -0.32 -1.78 -12.55** -1.74 -1.53 -10.17**
-2.37 -0.79 -8.56** -0.66 -1.6 -11.7** -1.63 -1.18 -9.59**
-5.38** 0.04 -10.31** 0.96 -2.24 -10.94** 0.49 -2.46 -6.77**
-2.39 -0.54 -10.24** -0.92 -2.78 -9.09** -0.32 -1.23 -7.2**
-2.63 -0.74 -10.19** 0.02 -2.28 -11.99** 1.86 -1.69 -5.91**
-2.51 -0.53 -11.12** -2.61 -1.31 -9.24** -1.77 -1.17 -10.13**
-2.63 -1.05 -10.23** -1.22 -1.4 -11.06** -1.79 -0.67 -5.9**
-6.69** 0.2 -9.47** 0.43 -2.15 -12.01** 1.79 -2.38 -7.5**
-1.84 -0.87 -10.01** -0.09 -1.8 -12.88** -2.14 -2.12 -10.25**
-1.78 -1.18 -10.98** -0.86 -1.98 -12.09** -1.83 -0.8 -8.98**
-2.96 -0.95 -10.71** -1.07 -1.43 -11.27** -1.75 -0.84 -6.02**
-3.31 -0.17 -10.53** 0.54 -1.82 -11.23** -0.23 -2.5 -9.94**
-1.84 -1.09 -10.38** -1.63 -0.94 -10.44** -1.63 -0.83 -8.99**
-7.58** -0.1 -10.37** 1.04 -2.37 -9.54** 2.13 -2.35 -7.2**
-4.25** -0.07 -9.37** 0.49 -2.66 -12.55** 1.31 -2.49 -7.03**
-1.54 -1.27 -9.43** -0.81 -1.62 -11.19** -1.38 -0.83 -8.08**
-3.41 -0.92 -8.96** -0.59 -1.89 -11.74** 1.74 -1.55 -4.99**
-3.97** -0.28 -10.23** 0.46 -2.32 -11.78** 2.12 -1.83 -7.08**
-3.18 -0.5 -9.53** 0.47 -2.1 -10.95** 2.09 -1.81 -4.96**
-8.41** 0.12 -11.05** 1.34 -2.23 -9.97** 1.29 -2.47 -5.31**
-1.94 -1.2 -10.67** -0.76 -2 -12.31** -1.7 -0.66 -9.38**
-1.52 -0.95 -9.11** -1.08 -1.62 -11.52** -1.66 -1.4 -6.77**
-2.83 -0.73 -8.76** -0.47 -1.96 -12.38** -1.69 -1.19 -10.02**
-3.42 -0.04 -10.57** 0.58 -2.01 -11.21** 1.82 -1.93 -6.74**
-1.6 -1.44 -9.29** -1.59 -2.6 -12.75** -2.21 0 -7.73**
-1.98 -0.71 -11.21** -1.18 -3.69** -11.3** -1.85 -0.79 -10.1**
-2.61 -0.57 -8.15** -0.83 -1.36 -11.19** -1.77 -0.9 -9.42**
-5.37** -0.1 -8.88** -3.66** -0.33 -5.06** -1.47 -1.27 -9.54**
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Table B.6: Lags and Number of Cointegration Relations
Country p q Cointeg. Country p q Cointeg. Country p q Cointeg.
DZA 2 2 2 DEU 2 2 2 NZL 2 4 2
ARG 4 1 1 GRC 4 1 1 NOR 2 1 1
AUS 2 1 1 HUN 4 4 1 OMN 2 1 1
AUT 4 2 2 IND 1 1 2 PHL 4 4 2
BHR 4 2 1 IDN 3 3 1 PRT 1 1 1
BEL 4 4 2 IRN 4 1 2 QAT 1 1 1
BRA 1 1 2 IRL 4 1 2 SAU 2 3 1
CAN 4 4 1 ISR 1 1 1 SGP 3 1 1
CHL 4 4 3 ITA 1 1 1 KOR 3 3 2
CHN 4 4 3 JPN 1 2 1 ESP 2 2 1
COL 4 4 2 JOR 4 4 2 SWE 4 1 1
DNK 4 2 2 KWT 4 2 1 CHE 2 1 1
ECU 1 1 1 LBN 2 1 1 THA 3 1 2
EGY 3 1 1 LUX 1 2 1 TUN 3 3 1
SLV 4 1 3 MYS 2 1 1 TUR 4 1 1
ARE 3 1 1 MEX 4 4 2 GBR 1 1 1
FIN 4 4 2 MAR 4 3 2 USA 2 1 1
FRA 2 2 1 NLD 1 1 2
Table B.7: F-statistics for the serial correlation tests
Cou. Y I Rs Cou. Y I Rs Cou. Y I Rs
DZA 2.21 0.9 0.36 DEU 2.41 1.12 1.44 NZL 0.41 0.59 0.08
ARG 2.11 3.83** 0.25 GRC 7.28** 0.72 0.25 NOR 0.66 2.15 1.19
AUS 0.87 1.34 2.08 HUN 14.25** 4.08** 0 OMN 2.4 2.79** 1.13
AUT 0.14 0.54 1.05 IND 2.38 1.11 0.63 PHL 1.35 2.42 1.62
BHR 2.38 2.06 1.07 IDN 0.32 1.48 0.98 PRT 0.61 2.4 0.57
BEL 2.41 3.86** 1.76 IRN 2.44 1.36 0 QAT 1.3 4.44** 1.85
BRA 1.01 1.87 0.21 IRL 0.32 0.88 0.49 SAU 0.81 2.37 0.98
CAN 0.72 6.15** 3.1** ISR 2.01 3.95** 1.2 SGP 2.71** 2.43 0.1
CHL 0.58 0.83 2.39 ITA 1.36 2 0.82 KOR 1.94 4.88** 1.07
CHN 6.43** 0.43 2.44 JPN 2.41 1.34 0.42 ESP 1.7 0.55 0.99
COL 2.27 4.84** 6.94** JOR 0.64 2.13 1.38 SWE 6.27** 5.58** 1.26
DNK 1.7 2.06 1.13 KWT 0.85 1.27 1.47 CHE 2.42 0.09 6.28**
ECU 0.67 4.73** 5** LBN 0.69 0.77 1.25 THA 1.24 1.38 0.13
EGY 1.36 1.62 0.66 LUX 2.03 1.04 2.12 TUN 1.21 0.45 1.34
SLV 0.65 10.14** 2.02 MYS 4.11** 2.35 0.54 TUR 0.28 1.05 1.57
ARE 0.55 0.62 2.95** MEX 1.11 2.49** 0.39 GBR 0.93 0.86 2.64**
FIN 3.73** 0.38 0.97 MAR 1.75 2.08 3.93** USA 3.19** 2.75** 0.37
FRA 0.84 0.98 0.98 NLD 0.7 0.15 0.86
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Table B.8: Tests for Weak Exogeneity
Cou. Ys Is Rss poil GPR Lq Cou. Ys Is Rss poil GPR Lq
DZA 0.45 0.36 0.52 0.44 2.90 0.68 JPN 2.77 0.00 0.62 0.66 0.08 0.02
ARG 0.00 0.49 1.52 0.00 1.25 0.04 JOR 1.53 0.63 0.04 0.78 1.32 1.94
AUS 2.47 2.66 0.07 2.20 0.33 0.00 KWT 0.44 1.64 0.05 0.01 1.33 0.91
AUT 0.55 0.71 1.91 0.74 0.15 2.40 LBN 0.08 0.71 0.23 0.91 0.92 0.34
BHR 3.1** 1.38 0.09 0.06 2.07 0.19 LUX 0.00 0.00 0.34 3.43** 1.46 0.71
BEL 1.04 2.21 2.34 2.11 0.73 1.86 MYS 0.00 0.14 0.03 0.00 2.06 0.74
BRA 2.32 2.88 2.62 1.66 1.20 0.38 MEX 1.38 3.36** 6.01** 8.74** 1.27 1.26
CAN 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.30 0.82 0.71 MAR 0.59 1.03 0.30 0.98 2.41 0.13
CHL 10.2** 0.43 0.73 4.92** 0.40 0.58 NLD 0.03 0.10 0.48 0.02 0.99 0.88
CHN 2.14 1.32 2.41 0.96 1.53 3.62** NZL 1.32 1.07 0.83 3.84** 2.57 1.78
COL 0.26 0.66 3.39** 2.83 0.90 8.21** NOR 0.62 1.45 0.30 1.50 2.62 0.18
DNK 0.21 2.38 0.18 2.53 1.04 0.29 OMN 2.54 0.28 0.26 0.20 2.27 1.55
ECU 0.02 0.13 0.06 0.91 0.02 1.73 PHL 2.85 0.80 4.85** 1.43 2.23 3.22**
EGY 0.23 0.58 0.73 0.10 0.03 0.71 PRT 1.87 0.45 0.09 1.23 0.00 1.07
SLV 2.31 4.89** 3.26** 2.54 0.19 0.69 QAT 0.20 1.67 0.07 1.14 0.75 0.95
ARE 0.10 1.05 0.03 0.49 0.10 0.01 SAU 5.13** 0.07 1.12 4.81** 0.83 2.78
FIN 3.11** 1.94 7.51** 3.42** 2.91 2.67 SGP 4.75** 13.52** 14.17** 2.13 2.20 1.53
FRA 0.33 0.22 0.98 0.05 2.97 0.12 KOR 2.02 1.37 2.37 3.41** 0.30 2.10
DEU 0.92 0.05 2.48 1.97 2.43 4.54** ESP 0.58 0.02 0.02 1.04 3.02 0.00
GRC 0.32 0.09 3.97** 0.60 0.42 0.15 SWE 5** 1.93 11.32** 10.64** 2.60 2.97
HUN 0.06 0.22 0.18 3.97** 2.41 1.83 CHE 5.08** 3.95** 0.12 0.09 0.21 1.15
IND 2.56 2.21 3.1** 1.56 1.41 0.29 THA 0.79 2.21 2.29 3.89** 0.23 0.44
IDN 0.75 0.03 0.00 9.06** 0.83 5.01** TUN 10.37** 13.88** 3.55** 2.79 2.62 2.49
IRN 2.56 0.29 1.26 0.24 1.13 1.10 TUR 0.23 0.32 0.16 0.41 0.09 2.51
IRL 2.63 0.90 3.74** 0.55 2.57 3.17** GBR 0.81 1.31 0.30 0.02 0.26 1.78
ISR 0.10 0.51 0.01 0.63 2.33 2.88 USA 1.39
ITA 0.02 0.90 2.37 4.6** 1.59 0.46
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C Figures
Figure C.1: Persistence Profile of the Effect of System-Wide Shocks
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Figure C.2: Country GDP Response to One s.d. Negative Oil Price Shock
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Figure C.3: Country Investment Response to One s.d. Negative Oil Price Shock
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Figure C.4: Country GDP Response to One s.d. Positive GPR Shock
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Figure C.5: Country Investment Response to One s.d. Positive GPR Shock
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Figure C.6: Country GDP Response to One s.d. Negative Liquidity Shock
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Figure C.7: Country Investment Response to One s.d. Negative Liquidity Shock
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Figure C.9: MENA GDP Response to One s.d. Negative Oil Demand Shock
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Emirates Iran
Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Morocco
Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Tunisia Turkey
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Figure C.10: MENA Investment Response to One s.d. Negative Oil Demand
Shock
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Figure C.12: MENA GDP Response to One s.d. Positive Oil Supply Shock
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Figure C.13: MENA Investment Response to One s.d. Positive Oil Supply Shock
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Figure C.14: Responses to One s.d. Negative Oil Demand Shock - Oil Production
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Figure C.15: Responses to One s.d. Positive Oil Supply Shock - Oil Production
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Figure C.16: Responses to One s.d. Positive Geopolitical Risk Shock - Oil
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